The Proper Japanese Subject: Censorship and State Control of Ideas and Discourse in Meiji Japan

Daniel Kanemitsu
B.A. Program in East Asian Studies




Presented to the 32nd Annual Proseminar Conference on 20th Century Japan
Chaired by Professor Byron Marshall (Department of History, University of Minnesota)



































March 10th, 1998 Draft







I. Introduction

Formulation of the Modern Japanese Man as Government Policy

	As the chaos of the Meiji Restoration passed and the new government settled down to undertake the business of the state, it embarked upon a social re-engineering effort unprecedented in Japanese history.  In little less then 50 years, Japan went from an obscure isolated island nation with little industrial economy to a full fledged imperial power that had won wars against the mighty Chinese Empire and Tsarist Russia.  Japan's modernization was thorough and swift.  The leaders of the Meiji Restoration felt that buying guns and learning science from the West was not enough for Japan to be able to fend for itself in the imperialist age.  It would need to modernize, from to top to down, and few aspects of society would be left untouched by this effort.  Least of all the Japanese mind.
	The government made it its own business to shape the conscious of the Japanese psyche.  The leaders of the Meiji government was convinced that the entire people of the nation must be mobilized in some manor or another if Japan was to have any success meeting its challenge from abroad.  Modernization was the wind and the government was at the wheel, while the commoners were expected to cooperate with the effort to ride out the storm of Western imperialist expansion into Asia.  The government therefore took it upon itself to make sure that the people of Japan were fit for this duty.  "Central to government's plans for economic expansions was the improvement of the people's spiritual health by the promotion of proper thinking and suppression of injurious ideas."(Mitchell 1976, 21)
	Debate over the issue of new modern Japanese morality and identity was passionate and involved numerous actors.  Quasi governmental think tanks such as the Meirokusha was established.  The leaders of the government called upon the scholars that represented all the major different schools of thought from the Tokugawa era.  The issue of the Japanese identity in the face of rapid social and economic change wood be called upon as a rallying cry for those that were in opposition to the government.  The Tokugawa class structure was abolished, the taxation system revamped, the structure of government being completely overhauled, and 250 years of relative isolation from foreign nations came to an abrupt end.  All these events compelled theorists and politicians alike to grapple with the issue of how to go about maintaining a Japanese identity.  There was a need to specify an ideal that could accommodate all these changes.  But that ideal in turn was expected to influence the direction the government would take in its policy for the modernization of Japan.  Issues over the Japanese identity was closely linked to a wide spectrum of policies that the new government faced in formalizing.  Education, family law, economic regulation, welfare, religion, and censorship were some of the policies that was dependent on the new Japanese modern identity.
	As time passed and more individuals started to appreciate the changes that were gripping nation, the issue of Japanese identity was an issue hotly debated in and out of government.  In summarizing an article featured in an October 1897 issue of Taiyo,  Carol Gluck points out "It became common parlance-probably for the first time in Japanese history that "just being born and raised in this country is not enough for the masses to be considered citizens (kokumin).  The prerequisite for citizenship is a sound sense of nation (kokkateki kannen)," without which the people remain "unpatriots" (hikokumin), and the nation endangered." (Gluck 25)
	But even as the general public took more note of the impact of the modern Japanese ideal, the control over the formulation of this ideal was firmly in the hands of the minority.  Specifically, those in a position of government that had the power influence the customs and behavior of the citizens and those that advised held the most sway.  The "top-down" nature of this process of Japanese identity formulation cannot be over-stressed in my opinion.  Regardless of how the public reacted, to the policies of government, what it reacted to was determined by the agenda that was adopted by the elite.
	To the last days of the Japanese Empire, the state was considered to have a legitimate role in actively molding the minds of its subjects.  Even as 50 years has passed since the repressive powers of the state was abolished with the establishment of the 1946 Peace Constitution, questions are abound as to how much Japan today has been successful at shaking itself free from the legacy of over 50 years of statist intervention into the minds its citizens between the Meiji Restoration and the end of WW2.


The Ever Changing Ideal

	The ideal modern Meiji-jin was an elusive figure.  The model was constantly in a state of flux as new developments in society and ongoing international relations strongly influenced the context of the ideal.  As the times changed, the model of yesterday needed to be updated to suit the needs of the state in today. The design was a work in progress right up until the onset of militarism of the 1930's
	The ideal went between that of the liberal Western enlightened man, the loyal respectful subject of the emperor, responsible member of the greater Japanese family, studious innovator and soldier, and member of the modern state.  The ideal was made up these components and differently interpreted along either Neo-Confucian thought, liberal Western philosophy, Prussian orthodox statist, or in a mixture of all three.  But as questions posed by intellectuals and political activists out of government that placed concern over these ideals started getting heard more, the state moved in an attempt to monopolize on discourse of the issue.
	As stated before the, the ideal was never really in the possession of the common people.  The government set down a tradition on specifying the ideal and it was up to the commoners to catch up to it.  This is not to say that resistance was not encountered, but nevertheless a relative minority of people had the power to transform that model.  By the 1910s, the government could list a number of proud accomplishments this policy helped make possible.  The victory over the war with China and Russia, the education of the masses, the development of an industrial economy, and the reversal of the unequal treaties that were signed under the gun during the late Tokugawa era.  During the Meiji period, the government could more or less credit this policy of "top down" modernization as successful, and while not everybody agreed with the claims, overall the masses seemed seldom willing to question this fundamental relationship.


The "Men Above the Clouds" and the "Selfish Populous"

	One of the consequences of the "friendly fatherly educating authoritarianism" was the establishment of the conception of the "kan - min" model.  The min is the masses and while kan specifically refers to the bureaucracy, in this context it can be refereed to the state authority overall.  The point is there was a wide gap in perception between the masses and the government, especially the oligarchy and later on the bureaucracy.
	In this model, the masses were considered to be too caught up with daily living, too earth bound to the rigors of making a living that prevented it from engaging in thoughtful political discourse.  The kan, on the other hand, was considered to be the respectable authority that was above all the special interests and vulgar desires of the masses.  They, and only the kan, could be trusted to make the difficult decisions, rise above partisan politics, and chart a responsible course to progress and prosperity.
	This relationship did not precluded the input from the min, but if a min was seriously about his (or her) aspirations to help chart the course of "Nihon-maru" (USS Japan), then he (or she) was expected to be disciplined and trained into becoming one.  The kan was idealized as the exceptionally enlightened that would lead the min.
	Debate raged over the status of the elected official.  Were they kan or min?  The Meiji oligarchy who were about to share power with the elected body preferred to seen them as an extension of the min and in many respects treated as such.  Elected politicians in the Meiji era had to contend with this issue and constantly dogged them as they tried to gain respectability to govern and influence national and local policy.
	Even as today, Japan is still carries this "kan - min" legacy.  What perpetuated it?  How did the policy of "prescribed liberty" get established?  What allowed the government to have such sway over the people and how did they go about doing it?  These are some of the questions this paper will attempt to answer.


II. The Tokugawa Legacy


Authoritarian Legitimacy and Segregation

	To be frank, the Tokugawa political system was divided between those that ruled and those that were ruled.  The society was rigidly stratified and the classes structure was maintained by the government.  Once born into one of the four classes ("shi nou koh sho": samurai, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants, in that order) you were expected to stay within that class for the rest of your life.  While there was some minimal amounts of social mobility, these were few and far between.  Positions of political power of inherited and it took extraordinary circumstances and exceptionally talented individuals for this protocol to be broken.
	While the samurai themselves were considered to be part of the "elite", holding office was the decisive factor necessary to make political input.  In other words, only those that held higher offices (or inherited that office to be sure) could expect to influence policy formulation, and few did.  "The expression of one's opinion about political, economic, and social issues was a privilege that could be exercised only on request from a superior." (Altman 231) One could only be in such position if they were already holding some political power.  It was position, and not class, that made all the difference.


Prohibitions of Political Actions

	This segregationist policy of political power necessitated a means to keep the issues regarding politics out of reach of the masses  "Knowledge of the facts of government "belonged" to those holding bureaucratic office, and since the majority of samurai and all commoners were normally out of office, there was no grounds for considering the diffusion of, or access to, official information." (Altman 231)
	The Tokugawa officials maintain a system of decentralized censorship.  Authorities in each city were responsible to insure that political issues and other most contemporary issues not included in publications.  Furthermore, publishers were mandated to be members of guild.  The individual regional and local bodies of publishers themselves were responsible to maintain the standards that were specified by the bakufu, thus they were incorporated in the decentralized system of censorship enforcement.  Those that were violated were punished severely at times with capital punishment never ruled out, but more significant was that the responsibility was also place on the guild itself.  Too many infraction and the guild could loose its license to publish at all. (Rubin 5, 17)  In referring to the climate of tolerance to publishing political issues Richard Mitchell states that "Political criticism, however mild, was equated with treason, and political "rights" were unthinkable." (Mitchell 1983 12)
	This did not mean that the bakufu maintained a totalitarian thought control mechanism that rivaled that of the system that was in place in Japan during the 1930s.  Gossip and satire was the chief means people vented their frustrations at the rulers and songs and plays that thinly disguised political criticism indeed was known to be abound.  We know this from the regulations that the bakufu passed specifically prohibiting kabuki to present material that would be have "undesirable political or moral influence". (Shively 1968 256-258)  But kabuki and senryu (haiku with satire) were not means of political protest and had little if any, effect on the overall policy formulation process.


Culture, Education, and Literature

	Another important legacy from the Tokugawa era was the deep chasm that separated the samurai culture and commoners' culture.  In the rural area, some of the samurai lived near the people in the villages, but the most lived in the castletowns, available for the lord if their service is needed.  In the towns, there was some convergence between the lower ranks of the samurai and the culture of the townsfolk.  But few self respecting samurai of stature would be caught at a kabuki performance.  That was for the "uncultureed" commoners, as the proper samurai was expected to practice waka and appreciate noh. (Shively 1968 231)
	Stripped of their power to be politically active, the wealthy merchants injected considerable capital into the "low" culture of the plays, dances, and other extravagant performance arts, and as a consequence, the "floating" culture blossomed.  (Beasley 20)
	This division of culture applied to the realm of education as well.  Japan enjoyed a relatively high literacy rate when compared to the other nations at the time (about half of all townfolk males could read and write) but the nature of education was decidedly voluntary with little or no state direct intervention by bakufu.  The commoner schools were typified by the Teragoya, or temple school, where basic reading and writing skills were taught in exchange for a nominal fee from the parents.  Lower ranked samurai and commoners both attended the terakoya in various combination but the curriculum was decidedly aimed at teaching basic skills.  For those that were expected to hold higher offices, more rigorous and cultured shijyuku and han schools awaited.  Many of these upper samurai schools were taught in a small classroom setting, the atmosphere was marked by a mentor to master relationship.  The pupil was in fact getting training for the job that his father held and he was to be equipped with the appropriate knowledge and culture that was demanded from that future position.  It was high education for the privileged few.
	Censorship in the Tokugawa period was centered around the catch all phrase of "Encouraging virtue and chastising vice." (Mitchell 1983 4 / Rubin 19)  As mentioned before, the common people considered to have no need to have access to information regarding current political issues.  Therefore, the promotion of such material was considered be immoral.  It has been pointed by Jay Rubin that this same principle had used to for the basis of censorship all the way through WW2.(Rubin 19)  .In fact this principle continues to be invoked in Japan even today.  The interpretation has changed by the language of the law lives on in section 3 article 21 of the Customs Tariffs Law. ("Books, illustrative publications, statues, and any other items considered to be disruptive to public order and injurious to public morals shall be not be imported")
	Even during the Tokugawa days, the "injurious to morals" clause was interpreted widely to cover political speech, publishing, and association.  Authors of publication that authorities could blame for specific criminal acts could be punished as well. (Mitchell 1983 9)
	The censorship practices could be divided into two realms of hard and soft books.  Those books that discussed academic, philosophical, religious, and other "difficult" issues were considered to be kataimono or "hard books".  The censors of the government monitored these publication more carefully as these publications were being circulated among those that were most likely to pose a threat to their polity it there was a threat to be found.  The yawarakaimono or "soft" books were geared toward the casual reader.  They were mostly fictional or historical dramas that were considered to be light entertainment and books unsuitable for the upper classes.  These books were primarily regulated by the gilds themselves as the authorities did not consider the books to as threatening as the hard books.  Consequently many more of the soft books managed to get around the censorship net as an upsurge of publishing after the 1800s made it very difficult for the Bakufu to keep close watch over. (Mitchell 1983 4-6)
	Before we move on the Meiji era, one important legacy of the samurai tradition has to be pointed out.  Not surprisingly, the samurai culture continued to exert wide influence even after the end of the Tokugawa era.  Edwin Reischauer points out that nearly half of those that would be considered to be the elite in Japanese society in the 1930s had samurai family backgrounds and the ratio remained as high as 20 percent even in the 1960s.  "The samurai who lived through the great change of the nineteenth century often remained distinct from other Japanese in their attitudes and pride, and the elite in Japanese society continued to be drawn heavily from the 6 percent of the population that had constituted the samurai class." (Reischauer 151)  In other words, those that defined the acceptable norms of debate over the issue of the ideal modern Japanese citizen/subject was largely composed of the former samurai class members.  The impact this domination the samurai class enjoyed cannot be disregarded.  Even as members of the government and the elite squabbled about, there was a common culture that they could fall back on.


III. The Search for the Ideal Meiji-jin: Meiji State Populace Modernization Prerogatives


Japanese Self Awareness

	Japan was made very aware of their uniqueness and distinct identity after it was robbed of its isolation by Commodore Perry.  Now the entire world opened up to the elite and soon more and more people would come into contact with either foreigners themselves or read about them.  This was the first time in nearly 250 years that the Japanese had a contrast to their own natural identity and culture.  David Pollack has argued that this confrontation with the alien forced the Japanese to re-examine themselves and try to come to grips with the elements in their society that defines who they are. (Pollack 40)  This theme has continued to be a popular theme in literature even today.
	Western analysis of Japan's "backwardness" quickly took center stage in the debate and definition of what it meant to be Japanese.  The Japanese reacted by passing a series of laws designed to uplifted from the perceived sense of "backwardness."  Practices such as mixed bathing and religious symbols such as fertility idols that were previously accepted to be part of life, was either banned or hidden away from public view in an attempt "to cleanse itself of this primitivist image and acquire the identity and credibility of a modern nation." (Allison 163)
	Debates regarding the "lack of character" in the Japanese masses preoccupied the intellectual interaction that took place in the Meirokusha during its time.  It was generally agreed that Japan's masses was far from "civilized" and needed to re-engineered to match the level of cultural and social sophistication that had been attained by the masses of those Western nations that were successful and prosperous.  The Meiji elite considered the Japanese people to be "lazy" and uncultured.  Two individuals that would later have tremendous power of education policy and statist moralizing, Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinoro, both "agreed with the Confucian humanists that individual morality in Japan was appalling and that self-reliance, industry, and moral uprightness must predominate if Japan had any hope of catching up with the West." (Fisher 86)
	The perception by the reforms that traditional Japanese culture and lifestyles not sufficient to counter the foreign threat led to what seemed like a near wholesale abandonment of native roots by some of the elite.  It took little time before Western styles of attire and fashion became the adopted style of the upper class in Japan.  Western accessories, food, clocks, hats, and books were being imported in volume. (Shively 1971 82)  It took little time before even the Emperor was fashioned like an European monarch.
	But beyond superficial fashion and appearance, deeper questioned needed to be addressed.  The role of the independent and enlightened individual was acknowledged as being instrumental to the success of the West.  The saw the people of the West as those that did not need the government to dictate what they were to do with their lives.  The individuals set out to in their unique way to improve their own and the nations welfare.  The question was how was this individual identity to take hold in Japan were the collective was instrumental in the behavior of people? (Pollack 41)
	One answer was to make the individual serve the state.  The individual's legitimacy would be defined by his position in the greater imperial family structure


Idealist Designs

	Both the traditionalists and the statist were in favor of placing the emperor at center of the nation.  Debate raged on what his function would be.  There was no doubt among the elite as to who really held power, but the details regarding the function of the emperor in the context of the polity had profound consequences for the ideal of the proper Japanese subject.
	The traditionalists reverted back to the traditional Confucian view of positioning the imperial throne as the center for public morals. (Hoshino 30)  Motoda Eifu, who would influence Japanese policy as a member of the government, was one of the most outspoken advocates of this theory. (Gluck 106-107)  This was a considerably leap from the argument that was being made by Fukuzawa Yukichi.  He had envisioned the Emperor to act as locus around which the citizens of the Japanese could rally around (Shively 1971 111)  This debate between Motoda and Fukuzawa lasted through out Meiji, but as time passed, the consensus generally shifted to Motoda's favor, as even Fukuzawa started to take up Confucian arguments after the Popular Rights Movement of the 1880s.  But that was to come later.
	One issue at agreement was the need to uplift the masses through education.  To this end, education was to be employed to "indoctrinate all schoolchildren with the ethic of emperor-loyalty so common among samurai loyalists of an earlier age." (Mitchell 1983 108)  But education would have a mixed flavor, especially in the early years.  West literature was read widely and self empowerment was the mantra that was repeated through out the classrooms of the early to middle Meiji. (Beasley 83, Fisher 85)  Western orientated education theorists successfully argued that since Japan was to learn a great deal from the West, it made sense to teach as they do in the West.
	An issue that cannot be passed away was the government's demand for more enlightened elite scholars and bureaucrats.  If Japan was going to modernize and if the modernization policy was to take a decidedly "top down" approach, then scholars and bureaucrats that could support in the state's function was essential.  Fukuzawa lamented about the sorry state of the Japanese masses, but held hope in that the new modern "middle class" made up of those of elite educational backgrounds could lead the nation to prosperity and esteemed civility. (Fisher 87-88)


The Emergence of "Serious Fiction"

	A "byproduct" of the emphasis for the development of the class of people Fukuzawa had in mind was those that took it upon themselves to narrate the meaning of being a modern Japanese individual.  This may not have been the intention of the Meiji leaders but as the new realm of news periodicals and learning from overseas increased, more and more intellectuals took the Japanese identity to the operating room and showed things about it that people found objectionable.
	This was not an automatic process.  Fictional story telling, to which literature belonged, was considered to be yawarakaimono, soft books meant for the masses.  Indeed it would take the influx of Western literature and persistent efforts of Japanese authors to develop their field before literature was to bloom in Japan.  But this took remarkably little time.  In little more than 20 years after the Meiji Restoration, issues of social commentary and individual identity was being so successfully addressed by the authors that the authority started feeling uneasy about the books.
	While a majority of chonin's literature during the Tokugawa might be considered to be overly formalized, it was a vibrant industry nonetheless.  An appreciation of fiction as entertainment was well established especially in the urban regions, but after the government split in 1873, the novel would become a medium of political activism.  Numerous novels that were meant to support the causes of the political opposition was written following of the split of the government and these books continued to be cranked out through out the time when the Popular Rights Movement was ongoing.  Most of the seiji shosetsu ("political novels") were little more then partisan propaganda and political indoctrination, (Kageyama 14, Shively 1971 112-113) but it broke new ground.  Ideology was now in the pages of literature and the novel became a means of social critique.  Soon, there was literature being put out that addressed these issues more intimately and with more precision.
	Inspired by Western literature, Tsubouchi Shohyoh in "Shousetsu Sinzui" makes the argument that emphasis on realism and the psychology of the characters being portrayed was an essential element to literature. (Kageyama 20, Shively 1971 114)  Soon classics followed.  Futabatei Shimei's "Ukigumo" (1887), Mori Ougai's "Maihime" (1890), Higuchi Ichiyoh's "Takekurabe" (1896)  By the 1890s and 1900s, literature on its own merit had important things to say about the identity of the Japanese, and subsequently catching the attention of the government and the intellectual community.
	Oguri Fuyo may not have been the first to cast the light of literature on the darkness of social situations but his material was driven and convincing.  He portrayed the suffering of the common folk and evils of capitalism in "Making Up For Bed" published in 1896.  To his misfortunate he included a health portion of provocative references to sexual activities that had previously had been common place in the popular fiction.  What was at issue was his style and subject matter.  His material was banned on the pretext that the book's contents was lurid and vulgar in style.  His contemporaries were critical in the manor in which he presented the material.  Indeed, the Home Ministry could easily claim they were mealy keeping excessively obscene material out of the hands of the public. (Rubin 42)
	Then Uchida Roan's "Broken Fence", which dealt with the issue of corruption of the elite, was banned. (Rubin 45, Mitchell 1983 157)  The banning of his book strengthened his conviction that literature must and should address the ills of society.  He was adamant that literature must strive for a higher ideal. (Rubin 49)
	Had all these writers been completely outside the mainstream of society, not as much attention would have been devoted to their material.  Oguri and Uchida's material has been largely forgotten in the context of modern Japanese literature.  History was not kind to their efforts.  But what made their books stand out in our exploration was that they were closely tied to the intellectual community and the scholarly elite.  Many Toudai graduates and faculty members were engaged in writing and this was starting to pose a threat to the government's monopoly defining the identity and culture of the Japanese in the modern era.


Literary Self Awareness

	The deliberations by numerous authors on the issue of identity and position of the modern Japanese man was powerful enough that those in government who wished to maintain their control Japanese cultural identity soon realized that literature was force to be dealt with.  This issue became especially pronounced with the beginning of the naturalist movement in the 1900s.  By 1910 numerous serious literature pieces were being censored by the Home Ministry while the Ministry of Education considered setting up a literary academy to regulate the production of literature.  The 1911 Committee on Literature sponsored by the Ministry of Education was the result of this alarm.  (Rubin 9, 195)
	As Meiji progressed into the later period, social alienation was starting to be felt by some of the intellectuals.  The hopes for a liberal and egalitarian society seemed ever so elusive as the statist mechanism of the government was reinforced by special interests and nationalist philosophy.  Many of those previously educated in a more liberal education system noticed these changes and fell into despair.  There seemed to be little hope for idealism in early 1900s for these intellectuals and this turn set the stage for "genmentsu" of Japanese literature and the rise of shizenshugi, or naturalism. (Mitchell 1983 147)  Naturalism entailed talking a close hard look at the insides of the character and to realistically portray the life and positions that people occupy.
	Uchida Roan's made the call to writers and scholars at the height of the naturalist movement to reassess the morals and philosophy of the modern Japanese man in 1910.  (Rubin 8-9)  The reaction of the government was to revert to "traditional morals".  This was a case of generational conflict, as represented by the controversy surrounding Shimazaki Touson's "The Broken Commandment": the young intellectual caught between older morals and newer ideals. (Rubin 61)
	Natsume Souseki, one of the greatest giants in modern Japanese literature became increasingly pessimistic in this climate.  Souseki`s Kokoro, published in 1914, is full references to the essential evil nature of man (Pollack 58) and the how self conscious analysis leads to self destruction (Pollack 65).  He questioned the Japanese dependence of the self to the whole.  Robbed of the traditional community and social identity, the modern individual's "self" is portrayed as a destructive to society and a representation of evil. (Pollack 65)
	Soseki's philosophy can be interpreted as a rejection of assumed loyalty of the Japanese citizen and the expected benevolence of the rulers. (Pollock 240)  Even in real life, Souseki refused to be "incorporated with the system".  Many in the Tohdai community lamented how Souseki his faculty position in Tohdai and chose to became a "shinbunya" (newspaper-man), but Souseki was determined to write instead of serving the "system".  He continued to shun away from recognition from authority.  He even would turn back a highly prestigious and honorary title of a doctorate degree that only the Ministry of Education can issue. (Rubin 197)  There is some speculation that the awarding of the Doctor of Letter from the Ministry of Education might have coincided with the attempts of Komatsubara, a Ministry of the Education official, to coax Natsume into accepting a seat in the 1911 literature committee project.  But even if that were the case, Natsume was determined to the end to remain an independent individual, free to observe the world around him in his own ways and not have institutional interests get in the way of his literary integrity.  It goes without saying that he rejected a seat in the 1911 literature committee.



IV. The State as Moral Guardian: Policy of Indoctrination and Opinion Control

The Struggles to Become the Moral Sage of Japan

	As Meiji Japan matured and developed, a sense of danger started to thicken in the air.  "Society, they [the late Meiji Japanese] said, was in disarray, afflicted with ills, beset by economic difficulties, roiled by the struggle for survival, upset by labor problems, exposed to dangerous thought, threatened by socialist destruction, rent by the gulfs between rich and poor, city and country, worker and capitalist.  Localities, like youth, were delinquent; self-government lay in confusion.  Cities were sinks of iniquity leading young people astray and the fomenting social strife, even revolution.  Customs were degenerating, morals in decline."  All the statements made above are a summery put together by Carol Gluck of the material that was being spewed out in volumes by "...bureaucrats, politicians, local officials, novelists, and storytellers...". (Gluck 28)  The elite was especially acute to this view.  These concerns seemed to be clear evidence that the nation had to be put back on course, it's objectives clearly defined, and the ills of development put under check.  Needless to say, these concerns will be raised time and time again over the debate on censorship, the right to regulate the mass media, and the questions over how to reform the school system to make it more statist.
	The nature of moralizing by the state was multifaceted.  Each ministry, school, politician, and even the news media strove to become the authority on the morals of Japan.  It was a given that the ultimate authority on national and individual morals was the Emperor.  The question was who best represented the wishes of the Emperor and which group should moralize who.  Over this issue each ministry competed against one another in an attempt to enhance their standing and prestige.  But neither did the schools nor the politicians surrender to the assertion of moral authority by the bureaucracy.  The academics asserted its authority on issues of state and morality on the basis of their intellectual and scholarly achievements.  The politicians argued that, as elected representatives of the people, they had a unique understanding of the masses and they were willing to assert their authority in the hopes of saving public morality.  These argument steamrolled over the voice of those that advocated for independent thought and remain an individual.  The perception was a nation in a danger of slipping into disarray and chaos, and there was little tolerance to be had for those that had such dangerous thoughts as "individualism" and "pacifism."
	In this section we explore the channels through which an individuals were indoctrinated with moralizing rhetoric from an orchestral symphony of "concerned parties".


Education policy

	Education was in essence about developing reliable, productive, patriotic, "civilized", loyal, obedient subjects for the modernizing nation.  While the content of the education shifted from being orientated to the West to the East over the course of time, the overriding goal of what education was suppose to achieve remained remarkably unchanged.  In the end, the goal was to mass-produce lawful and loyal state subjects, who which the nation could to call upon in its attempt to modernize and compete in the world.  Education was an obligation to the state, not a natural right of the citizens.
	Another important aspect of the Meiji education system is the academic elite.  The "Best and Brightest" of academic achievers had the opportunity of attending the most prestigious universities of Japan.  The atmosphere within these institutions were noticeably different from the outside world.  Toudai, Kyoudai and other highest Japanese institutions were there to provide the technical expertise that the nation would have to rely on to modernize.  But something more fundamental was different about these schools.  These schools provided the state with the elite with which they could rule the nation.  Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to state that Toudai and other schools like them were as much part of the "ruling system" as opposed being underneath it.
	In the initial 1872 Council of State proclamation on education (Shively 1971 86), the tone was of individual empowerment and enlightenment.  But over the course of the Meiji era, the school system would be increasingly become authoritarian and centralized, its content shifting its emphasis from Western learning to filio piety and loyalty to the emperor, and its goal shift from enlightenment to that of indoctrination of statist moralistic agenda.  The structure followed the path of nationalization, consolidation, and centralization which all following early days of experimentation.
	The early days of government sponsored (but supported with local taxes) elementary compulsory education was marked with confusion, uncertainty, and excitement.  Western test books were brought in to replace the "out dated" Tokugawa books.  The building themselves were built anew in impressive Western style architecture.  The schools were not always greeted by the local community in a favorable light. Some were razed to the ground. (Nagai 54-60)  In other instances the schools became the nests of political discontent.  The school through a dizzying number of reorganizations and curricular reforms.  Between the Education Act of 1872 and the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, the school system went through numerous reorganization, curriculum specification, structure re-arrangement, centralization, and at least 5 major government reforms of education system.  There were other numerous minor adjustment taking place constantly.
	In the 1870s, politically motivated schools of the former samurai sprouted very where.  While at first embracing the schools as a supplement and stop gap measure until the compulsory system was in place, the government quickly withdrew its support following the government split of 1873.  Now the shijuku had become the political hotbed for government opposition.  The government swiftly moved in and expanded its authority to cover the private schools as well.  (Rubinger 221)
	For some in the government, this was all too much.  There was a clear need to set aside a long term strategy to incorporate the schooling system with the governments aims of stability and growth.  After considerable debate between Itoh Hirobumi and Motoda Eifu regarding the emphasis on schooling, the education policy noticeably turned conservative in the 1880s.  Motoda and Nishimura Shigeki's arguments against the liberal Western teaching was on their perceived "incompatibility" of Western teaching with Japanese life. Motoda's calls were joined by Nishimura Shigeki, Ministry of Education official and imperial tutor, and Egi Kazuyuki.  They consistently advocated for the depoliticization of the schools (forbidding teachers and students from participating in political activities) and indoctrinating the children with respect for the emperor as a figure and an authority on the morals of the nation. (Gluck 106-107)  He could not see the validity in adopting Western texts to teach Japanese children. (Shively 1971 87)
	By 1879, Motoda Eifu's voice was heard loud enough that it was starting to influence national curriculum policy.  Emphasis on teaching traditional Confucian teachings was put upon the educational programs. (Gluck 105, Marshall 1994 54)  But the Western orientated fought back, but charted their course in a different path.  Mori Arinori, becoming the Minster of Education in 1885, agreed that there was need for reform in the school and centralizing the system to make it serve the state better.  He agreed with the depoliticization and carried these out accordingly in such ways as more thorough indoctrination of the teachers (Rubinger 225) and more stringent curriculum specification, but the Mori differed with Motoda on the issue of moral centering. His goal was to streamline the curriculum more toward the interests of the state. (Rubinger 224-225, Shively 1971 88)
	In 1889, Mori died as a consequence for concern of state over the emperor.  A fanatic supporter of the emperor killed him with a bomb.  With Mori gone, the issue of education heated up again.
	Nose Sakae, an official of the Ministry of Education, advanced the idea that the Japanese have their unique sense of morality that which centers around the emperor.  These traits were argued to come about naturally and therefore, as long as Western teachings did not wash out these "native" morals, there was no reason to preach it. (Shively 1971 108)
	But Motoda took this argument different.  He felt that there was a need reinforce this morality and set it out as official policy.  The stage was set for the Imperial Rescript for Education, released 1890.  The rescript was more than a proclamation on the virtues of education and morals that were to be taught.  This document had a profound impact on setting down the definitive concepts of morals that were appropriate for the proper Japanese subject.
	The Prefectural Governers' Conference in Tokyo in February 1890 had an important impact.  Komatsubara Eitaro, who would later on attempt to counter the immoral influence of novels in the 1910s, was the prefectoral governor of Saitama Prefecture and submitted in to the assembly an idea for the content of education.  At issue was clarification of the school curriculum but the discussion quickly turned to the issue of morality.  Eventually a proposal was made to the Prime Minister at the time, Yamagata.  To him this was the perfect vehicle with which the government could reinforce its authority regarding the question of public morality.  (Gluck 115-119, Nagai 41)
	The rescript was very short.  It would easily fit on this page.  But the true significance it held was in the links that it established between the polity of the nation with loyalty and filio piety, enshrining civil obedience, state service, and self sacrifice, all linked together within a Confucian framework. (Gluck 121)
	Now the "scientific" attributes of the modern education system would be put to the service of instilling traditional Confucian values into the minds of school children.  The Rescript would be called upon again and again by the government as a theoretical legitimization of its policy of intervention in to the minds of its citizens. (Gluck 127)
	Interpretations abound on the full significance of the Rescript.  On a related note, it must be pointed out that education had not been considered to be a right but rather an obligation of the subject.  No where in the constitution says that subjects have the "right" to an education.  Instead, it would be better framed that education was an obligation on the part of the individual in his or her service to the state, similar in obligation as taxes and conscription. (Hoshino 9)  In fact educating the masses was considered to be part of the right of the Emperor's rule (and by extension, the right of the government that rules on the behalf of the Emperor.) "...the right of to educate was considered to be situated with the Emperor, and the right to regulate principles for teaching and administration was also considered to be in the Emperor's right." (Hoshino 27, 36)
	Before we leave off on the topic of education, one segment has not been addressed that deserves special attention.  The academic elite that constituted an integral function of the government.  The top universities of Meiji served a dual rule.  They trained the those that would become the bureaucrats of the state.  But it also provided the government with technical and specialized advise that they could get from few other sources.  The government was considerably dependent on the services that the universities provided.  As consequence the elite university was one the few areas where considerable freedoms were exercized.  Numerous ideas that were discussed in the class room could not be discussed outside without risk of punishment.  But this freedom rarely propelled the institution to press the government to expand freedom for all the people.  On the contrary, it was agreed that because the university was an elite institution, it was privileged to research and explore issues the masses could not be trusted with.  While this system worked well while the government could absorb most of the graduating classes of the universities, it spelled trouble when the time came when the government could not. Individuals that would have otherwise gone to the government for work were in the civilian employment, or worse yet, in the opposition groups to the government, giving the opposition intellectual respectability in their voices of dissent. (Marshall 1992, Passin 264-265)


The Press: Transition from opposition papers to moral leaders

	Newspapers became one of the most important battlegrounds regarding morality, identity, polity, and idealism.  The news media was the point of contact for many intellectuals, government agencies, educators, and politicians in their quest to preach to the populace.
	Initially the government encouraged the growth of the newspaper industry as a means to educate the populous.  This strategy would go through a dramatic transition following the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 (aka Seinan no Ran).  Large numbers of newspaper that acted as the spokesperson for the political opposition dotted the landscape of Japan, and along with this the government suppressed numerous publications countless numbers of times.  From then on, it became a matter of important government policy to monitor the views and opinions that were being published through the media.  The newspaper industry responded to this government intervention by changing its character and role.  No longer dogmatic ideological rhetoric and political rallying points, the newspaper transformed itself as a wise and insightful observer of the world around them.  Some one that the newspaper reader relied on to make sense of the government and the events in the world.
	We will discuss the censorship mechanism that prompted this transition more in detail in the last part of this section and instead devote our analysis of newspapers with regard to its transition of its role in society.  The censorship by the government undoubtedly motivated this transition in part, but there are other factors that deserve attention.  Notably the rise in readership, the transformation of the newspaper industry, and the connections between the government and the press. 
	In April of 1869, the press was formally recognized by the new government.  Newspapers were allowed to operate and disseminate information to the masses on the basis that it would obey certain restriction set out by the government.  As Altman points out "Thus, the Japanese press came into being almost simultaneously with the Meiji state." (Altman 237)  The newspapers enjoyed an intimate relationship between the press and the government in the early years.  Those close to the government became patrons for some papers.  Many newspapers were published as part of a collaborative effort that involved local government offices and commercial enterprises. (Altman 238)
	The government relied on the newspapers to disseminate information and policy.  In some cases the authors were samurai while the money for publishing was put out by commercial businesses. (Altman 245)  Yomiuri was an example of this relationship.  The Yomiuri editorial policy represents some of the efforts of other samurais in their attempt to author for newspapers.  The Yomiuri took it upon itself to explain difficult government regulations and complex international events.  The font and the type-setting the paper was designed to so that it could be accessible to those that were not advanced readers. (Altman 245-246)
	The state sanctioned the press as a modernizing agent (1871 dajyokan).  The goal was to educate the masses, develop their knowledge, and help usher the masses into enlightenment.  "In other words, newspapers were to serve policy and not to be vehicles for the expression of discontent" (Altman 237)  The importance of the newspaper was respected highly by the government and at one time there was a serious attempt at establishing a state sponsored press, but this fell through. (Altman 238)
	As mentioned before, the nature of newspaper went through a marked transformation following the government split of 1873. (Altman 239, 241)  But beyond the censorship of the period, this transition helped the newspapers end its role as quasi-government organizations and instead reinvented itself as full fledged commercial interests.
	The press continued to evolve through out the 1880s and the 1890s as a private enterprises.  During the Popular Votes Movement, the newspapers adopted thoroughly political voice, but it also adopted a marked critical view government that it has maintained to this day.  But as the Popular Voting Movement lost steam and political activism was not sufficient as a means to commercial operation, the press surrendered some of its political ideals in return for wider commercial interests to be exploited.  The newspaper's character changed considerably.  They became "vulgar" as the interests of the reader, and not the ideals of the publisher were the interests that needed to be protected. (Altman 242)
	With the withdrawal of official support the newspaper market roughly divided into two "genres": the "low" popular press and the "respectable" elitist press, representing the two readership markets. (Rubin 37, Altman 242-244)  This differencization would fade away as the bigger "elite" newspaper started carrying the more populist articles.  Eventually the two styles converged as thoughtful editorials as well as lowly "third page"(sex and crime) stories began to be featured in the major press publication. (Rubin 39, Altman 246)
	By the time the Sino-Japanese War erupted, the newspaper had fallen to the status of a tabloid in some respects.  It featured the glorification of the deeds of the Japanese soldiers. Now flamboyant exaggerations and sensational details became popular tools to be employed for the aim of making their periodicals more popular. (Keen 130)
	One aspect that must be reminded is that the Press and the Literature were not two independent entities.  The newspapers featured serialized stories.  Some were fictional, some were "documentary", some were high literature, a lot was mass produced stories that excited the readers and did little more.  However, numerous authors of literature contributed to newspapers.  In fact, Natsume Souseki, Ishikawa Takuboku, and Futabatei Shimei, who are among the literary giants of the Meiji era, were all employees of Asahi Newspaper at one time or another.


Literature: Who's fiction?

	The role of literature made a clear transition by the 1900s.  By the time Meiji was drawing to a close, both domestic and foreign literature was important sources for public opinion and influencing the intellectual construct of Modern Japan.  The authorities could not disregard the works of the naturalist as simple trash, something read as entertainment and quickly forgotten afterwards.  The books were addressing serious social issues.  What is it to be a Japanese?  What is the price of modernization?  What should we attempt to preserve from our Tokugawa past and what should we leave behind?  What does it mean to be an individual in the modern age?  The authorities may have of been well aware of the impact this medium.  But even as it quickly grew into maturity, the government continued to treat as trash.  Those elements of literature that they would criticize and ban would be censored on the pretext that it was scandalous and was a corrupting influence on the Japanese collective mind
	Questions started to arise regarding the suitability of literature and its dangers after naturalism hit the literature community.  Some of the first shots over the debate were fired in the January 1908 issue of Taiyo.  In the magazine, prominent writers, faculty members of universities, and intellectual opinion leaders agreed on the "deplorable state" of modern fiction.  Questions were raised regarding the suitability of the material in the hands of impressionable children and women.  One individual featured in the magazine pointed out the opinions of a recent Minister of Education who lamented on the "corruptive" influence contemporary fiction was having on the youth.  In the end, most agree that government intervention was not a good idea.  But as naturalism was associated with the corrupting values of liberalism, individualism, and pessimism, it would become increasingly difficult to do so. (Rubin 63)
	Naturalism earned its reputation for realistic and uncompromising harsh review of human nature.  Unfortunate these very same virtues earned the recognition of the naturalist material as "pornography."  Criticism that cast a negative light on has been documented from both other literary journals as well as news coverage. (Rubin 63, 66-67)  While this is not surprising, it was rather unfortunate that those critics of Shinzenshugi did not see it worth protecting from the censors, for some encouraged the censors to act on this recent "threat to the moral fabric of the nation".
	"For these [naturalist and naturalist influenced] young, Western-educated writers, there was no established truth.  They questioned the sanctity of the family.  They portrayed the destruction of Confucian moralism by irresistible sexual urges.  And so the older leaders of the establishment was aghast.  The moral fabric of the nation was being torn to shreds by shameless pornographers, they said." (Rubin 7)
	While the Ministry of Education experimented with the idea of literature regulation (which backfired), the great majority of direct action against literature was carried out by the Home Ministry.  They had the power to regulate any publications deemed to be of threat to society.  Now naturalism was their target.
	Naturalism went on trial in 1908 when Ikuta Kizan ("The City") and Bungei Kurabu was indicted. (Rubin 83-89)  The realistic portrayal of difficulties in making a living in post Meiji Japan was considered to be obscene.  The question at hand was the (alleged) affair of the wife who sleeps with her husband's benefactor a scandalous affair that needed to be singled out and removed from exposure to the public.  In the prosecution arguments Koyama argued that this case was being indicted because "...to rescue contemporary literature from its own depravity and to preserve social morality." (Rubin 85)  The unusual aspect of this trial was that it took place at all.  Questionable material would usually be banned on a administrative basis and never prosecuted.  There was no need most of the time.  But apparently Procurator Koyama Matsukichi felt strong enough of this case that he wanted to make it into a show trial.  "...Procurator Koyama Matsukichi (who would later rise to the posts of Procurator General and ultimately Minister of Justice, playing a key role in formulating thought-control policies for the Saitoh regime of 1932-1934) felt that naturalism posed so grave a threat to the nation that a public example had to be made."(Rubin 83)
	There was little support from the press.  "...reporters from both [Asahi and Kokumin Shinbun] made it clear that they maintained the old prejudices against writers as amusing freaks.  Their stories were aimed more at eliciting laughs than chronicling an authentic bid for the freedom of the individual conscience." (Rubin 83-84)
	When the guilty verdict was handed down, it propelled the government's steam for more censorship.  Shizen Shugi could be made responsible for the decadence of society, and the government censors wasted no time to that end.  Also in 908 was the Morita/Hiratsuka Attempted Suicide Incident (Baien Jiken) hits the news. (Rubin 89-91)  The reckless behavior that two extraordinarily talented young academic achievers was attributed to the rise of Shizenshugi.  Then there was a rape and murder by Kameyama known as the Debakame Incident.  This indeed have no physical nor ideological link but, as Jay Rubin puts it "The identification of Debakame and naturalism was more an accident of timing than common sense.  Surely no one was suggesting that a semiliterate gardener was combing the literary and intellectual journals to find naturalist debauchery for himself." (Rubin 91)
	The point was naturalism was getting linked to deviant behavior.  Naturalism was being juxtaposed with sexual depravity.  Those fiction that remained within the traditional framework and did not question the structure of society could get away with lots of sex and violence, but material that questioned ourselves, the meaning of different actions as represented by shizenshugi, was considered to be pornographic and a bad influence, and it mattered little even only a few actually read them. (Rubin 93)
	Another consequence to the government criticism of the naturalists was that few in the public was reading the material, and hence the public had no idea what was being taken away from them.  In fact, there was considerable support for the government pressure by the general public, who had equated naturalist material with decadent sexually deviant literature. (Rubin 95)  From the public's point of view, nothing was being taken away from, and in fact, they were being protected from something that was (supposedly) subversive to family structure (all ways a vote winner) and the recent prosperity of Japan.  The argument was that this kind of stuff will rot the minds of the young and make them unproductive, authority questioning nihilists, and there was no place for people such as those in the world such as now from the stand point of the masses. (Rubin 94)
	The pressure on the naturalism movement would only increase as the Meiji era drew to a close.  By 1911, experimental attempts at regulating the production and consumption of literature was undertaken with the establishing literature committee came into being under the authority of the Ministry of Education.  Literature was deemed to be that of the state and not the individual authors.


Mechanisms for Moral Cohesion:  State Powers of Censorship

	The primary means of censorship during the Meiji era was indirect censorship, where material would be censored after publication.  Material found to be objectionable would be recalled and the publisher would be penalized for its role in publishing the injurious material.
	At one point the Government did play a hand in direct censorship, or going through material before it went to press.  But this was extremely difficult to conduct due to sheer volume of material that was being published.  By the time the 1875 Newspaper Ordinance came into effect, the government had little choice but accept indirect censorship as it means of regulating newspapers. (Mitchell 1976, 22)
	The bureaucracy held immense power over the material that it censored.  In sum, the laws were fashioned vaguely to allow the bureaucrats maximum leeway over the implementation and made it nearly impossible to object the judgment of the bureaucracy by placing the authority squarely in the administrative rights of the bureaucracy.  The decisions could not be appealed upon as these decisions were outside the scope of the law.
	The power and significance of administrative regulation is well perceived by Mitchell: "...in Japan violations of the law involving political organizations and publications were primarily regulated, not by the courts through trials, but in an administrative fashion by the police, using prohibition orders.  Thus, from the early Meiji period, the government tended to rely on administrative management rather than on criminal trials in order to maintain public tranquillity." (Mitchell 1976 24)
	From the onset of the Meiji, the government made its intention clear that the censorship policies of the Tokugawa period would be carried over. (Mitchell 1983 20)  After the initial siege mentality of the government receded, the regulations were somewhat relaxed.  They perceived that mass media could play an important role in the modernization, but the right of the government to censor was never questioned. (Mitchell 1983 26-27)
	The West played its part in promoting the statist attitudes of censorship as a means to suppress political opposition.  The new government was given advise from Western advisors to employ censorship as a means of consolidating power and suppressing criticisms against the government by the intellectuals. (Mitchell 1976, 22)  The legitimacy of censorship and active manipulation of public opinion was rarely questioned by the new government, and in fact to some degree it was encouraged by West, and instead what was at issue was devising the legitimate means of censorship and what censorship was hoped to achieve as a policy.
	Censorship was centralized from a very early start with the 1868 Publication Ordinance. (Mitchell 1983 28)  Tokyo was the not only the political capital of the new Japanese government, but also will would be made into the censorship capital as well.
	Two separate punitive processes could be evoked as punishment for violating state standards.  The Home Ministry could ban a publication outright and the publisher would be left with a large financial burden.  Furthermore, the Home Ministry could evoke special powers regarding licensing to punish frequent troublesome publishers.  If the threat of administrative punishment was not enough to discourage deviation from the guidelines set down by the bureaucracy, then additional steps of court proceedings and criminal charges could be pressed.
	Linking public peace and public morals was a connection that had been established in some the first censorship laws.  The 1873 press regulations forbade the publication of "any material that might insight public unrest."  With the 1875 Publication Ordinance, the censorship powers were formally  transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Home Ministry.  Press regulations really tightened up.  No criticism of the government tolerated.  The period known today as the "Newspapers' Reign of Terror" began. (Rubin 21)  The 1875 Publication Ordinance was reinforced with the passage of the Libel Law of 1875.  The definition of libel was made vague and encompassing enough that it could be invoked against the negative criticism of the government made by liberal opposition forces. it was quite certainly designed as a another weapon to be used against the Jyuu Minken Movement. (Mitchell 1983 49-50)
	"In essence, the entire prewar Japanese system of publication control was the extended application of an emergency wartime measure formulated when the fledging Meiji government was undergoing one of its most crucial struggles for survival" (Rubin 21)
	These laws would be useless unless there was a bureaucracy of ready to enforce these standards.  The growth in censorship coincided with the growth in the size and strength of the of bureaucracies in Japanese government.  The bureaucracy was considered to be above all the partisan politics and the selfish interests of the masses.  Their apolitical concern for the welfare of the nation was touted, used as legitimization for their powers as moral watch dogs over the nation.  The intense competitive spirit between the offices cannot be underestimated.  The Home Ministry dominated the censorship process but they were no alone.  By the time 1909 Press Law was passed, not less then 6 ministries were recognized to have the power to censor.
	The Home Ministry was the vanguard of security and safe morality of the nation.  The 1875 Publication Ordinance formally entrusted the ministry with the power to prevent of the dissemination of material "disruptive to public peace and order" and "Injurious to public morals"  In 1876, a supreme court decision specified that these powers to be an "unique right" of the ministry and the law was not even necessary to empower the ministry to conduct those actions.  The 1875 ordinance was a mere formal recognition of the power of the government to regulate such material. (Rubin 22, Kasza 8)
	The Home Ministry greatly expanded its powers under Yamagata Aritomo's leadership in 1887.  The "strong arm" of the Meiji oligarchy pulled no punches in the ordinances that were passed while he occupied the ministership.  The infamous 1887 Hoan Jyorei (Peace Preservation Ordinance) was passed while he was the Home Minister.  The Home Ministry's wide powers to censor is formally recognized as part of its function.  No recourse would be tolerated.  The chances of a 1876 verdict that would go against the interests of the government was, for all intensive purposes, forever sealed. (Rubin 16, 24)  On a technical note, now the Home Ministry could ban the distribution of books.  Previously the law states that the Ministry had the right to ban sales but not distribution yet.  This loophole was not very significant but it did allow some books to fall through the cracks as a banned book might not get returned or become "lost".  The point was, not the censorship laws were adjusted so that not only the publisher but the retailer would incur the wrath of the Ministry when it came to books.  (Mitchell 1983 81)
	One particularly useful tactic was that the censor's standards were never published.  This would have important implications not only as a strategy (you don't have to commit yourself to any specific norms and guideline, less you want to change them later) but also significantly influenced the operations of the publishing companies (see below) (Mitchell 1983 150-151)
	The concerns of the Home Ministry, as seen already, far exceeded any narrow legislated agenda.  Its powers were broad and sweeping and little of its power was under check.  It was deemed necessary by the Meiji oligarchs that the Home Ministry would need these powers in order to safeguard the hegemony of the government and be the moral and political watchdog over society.  If trends that were deemed to be unsuitable was taking hold, it was the responsibility of the Home Ministry to stem this trend, whether it be literary, political, or social.  The concerns of the Home Ministry moved along with the shift in intellectual perception of the Japanese identity.  As more serious pieces of literature appeared, re-appraising the Japanese identity and finding one's place within modern society, slowly the Home Ministry began to take notice of the implications these works.  The Home Ministry represented the conservative and statist elements that it considered to be so vital in making Japan great.  Any threat to these social institutions were thus considered to be a threat to national security. (Rubin 94, Mitchell 1983 146-148)  Later this philosophy would result in the Home Ministry's war on "ism's".  Any type of ideology not sanctioned by the state was concerned to be a threat and closely monitored (Rubin 108-109)
	The legitimacy of censorship was further affirmed with the Diet passing the Press Law of 1909. (Rubin 115-117)  Even before the Diet solidified the powers to censor, the cabinet itself had wide powers to redirect the course of liberal legislation that included, but was not limited to, freedom of expression issues.  Sadly, the cabinet would later on be able to rely on the members of the Diet to that for them.  The Diet's Lower Houses attempts at curving the excessive censorship powers of the Home Ministry, which eventually ended up in passage of even more repressive laws, deserves some attention.
	Considering that the lower house included large numbers of former newspapermen, it is rather surprising at how slow the body moved to curve the powers of censor.  Matsukata Masayoshi made a deal with Ohkuma Shigenobu's Shinpotoh in order to gain the needed support for his second prime minstership.  Ohkuma's somewhat liberal Shinpotoh took a pounding from the earlier repressive measured against political opposition and as a consequence pressed the second Matsukata cabinet into promising that it would respect freedom of expression and the right to dissent.  When a scandal broke regarding an "unsavory relationship between Itoh Hirobumi and the Imperial Household Minister Hijikata Hisamoto and Vice-Minister Yamada Akiyoshi" the government was rocked about with fierce debate regarding how to deal with this situation.  In the end the decision to censor was made, but not without sacrifice.  The Matsukata Cabinet introduced a bill that would restrain the wide powers of the Home Minster to censor.  This time, Minoura Katsundo, a member of the diet that had been frustrated by stonewalling over his Press Law reform package took the opportunity to lead for the reduction of powers to censor.  (Mitchell 1983 127-131, Kasza 15)
	In 1909, the Katsura Cabinet along with the Seiyukai party took the liberal press law reform bill and reworked it so that it was even more repressive against organizations that the state felt was hostile to the interests of the state.  Undoubtedly, the surge in leftist activity helped justify this policy.  The argument was that this law was designed to clamp down on extremist publications and the mainstream newspapers need not be concerned with the implications of the law being applied against themselves. (Mitchell 1983 141-142, Kasza 17-18)  Parts of this law was even more repressive and authoritarian than before.  The new law granted the Home Ministry even wider administrative powers to censor by allowing the Ministry to ban books unilaterally without simultaneously filing to the courts.  They could be enforced independent of any court decision. (Mitchell 1983 144, Kasza 15-16)  Even more amazing was the lack of criticism from the press.
	"Passage of the [1909] Newspaper Law is best explained by three factors: the new willingness of the Diet opposition to work for change within the constitutional framework; a corresponding change in the politics of the mainstream press; and the appearance of socialist intellectuals and a workers' movement that were anathema to the establishment as a whole." (Kasza 16)  Political jockeying to look "tough" was not about come for some time until Japan was well into the late Taisho era, but the parties were in respect in competition with the new political movements that were come about as a result of industrialization and rapid urbanization.  They shared an interest along with the Meiji oligarchy to stamp down on their competitors, and press regulation was seen as an effective means to this end. (Kasza 17)
	The Ministry of Education was entrusted with the goal of protecting children from the evils of reality.  It goes without saying that the Monbu-Sho exercised tremendous power over the curriculum of the schools.  But by making the argument that mass produced literature and fiction had an adverse effect on the intellectual upbringing of a children, the Ministry of Education tried to extend its power to regulating literature.  This was not very successful at least in the Meiji era as the 1911 committee on literature only lasted 2 years.  But this legacy for oversight of material that comes into contact with students lives on. (Rubin 9)
	The renewed interest in public morality during the 1910's allows even more hierarchical and kokutai dogma for the school children.  Komatsubara, an official in the Ministry of Education, took where the Imperial Rescript left off and manipulated the curriculum much more imperialistic, nationalist, and strengthened the emphasis on the individual's obligation to the Emperor. The myth of Imperial lineage was turned into fact.  Filio piety for the family and the patriotism for the nation was made into one.  As Rubin describes it, this curiculum was designed to be exact contradiction to the literary question that were starting to be raised by the naturalist movement. "Literature stood in direct opposition to the state's orthodoxy whenever it questioned the sanctity of the family, or implied a change in the family structure by portraying liberated women, or suggested that an individual might live for himself and not for his family as part of the family-state..." (Rubin 109-110)
	One issue that has to be addressed more carefully is the capitulation of the mass media to censorship and how this set a dangerous precedence for the years to come.
	The state had other means besides from official powers with which to censor material and influence the publishing behavior.  One informal means through which the state reinforced the cohesive power over mass media was the consultations that were conducted between the publisher and the Censorship office of the Home Ministry.  A ban on a publication has disastrous consequences for the publisher who has already invested costs for publishing the book.  In an attempt to avoid being stuck with dead stock, the publishers tried their best to find out what the Censorship office was looking for and what might set them off.  This created an atmosphere were the well behaving publisher could sneak in a sample before publication and have some "estimates" be made.  This privilege was not reserved for troublesome publishers. (Rubin 28-30)
	Needless to say, self censorship practices became common, if not a necessity to continue publishing as a commercial enterprise.  Some companies did this more blatantly with replacing particularly "offensive" parts of the book with circles and crosses.  Others would completely rewrite the material, making the heavy hand of censorship invisible.  This later tactic would become increasingly more common as Japan went into the war years. (Mitchell 1983 96-99)
	While little discussed in books, another favorite technique of the government in their censorship strategy is the non-legal pressure that was exerted against family members and the friends of those that were deemed to be "a threat to the moral cohesiveness of Japan".  Pacifists and socialists, when not being out right suppressed, were made to feel heat of the government via their friends and family as the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Education pressured their loved ones instead.  Association to a "subversive" could have disastrous consequence to those that relied on government discretion for their employment.  Constant surveillance of the loved ones was another favorite. (Mitchell 1983 136-137)
	Censorship did not always come from above, but from the peers as well. "Those that sought freedom of expression faced a double risk: Suppression by a modern police structure or non-governmental pressure and agitation by "concerned" groups.  In fact, official censorship was sometimes triggered by cries of outrage from various censorial groups.  Faced by a real threat of strong group pressure in a society in which there was little room to escape from the group, and surrounded by numerous repressive laws and regulations controlling freedom of expression, many writers withdrew into a purely private world or carefully avoided controversial subjects." (Mitchell 1983 103)
	An element that cannot be dismissed is the adverse effect capitalism sometimes have on the solidarity of the press and publishers.  In a long term stand points, it makes economic sense to stand up to censorship and support those fellow publishers that become target of censorship.  No business could operate with large degrees of uncertainty about its revenue security.  But in a short term view, the shut down of a competitor redirects more money for those that stay in business.  While I could not notice industry wide trends over this issue in the Meiji era, as Japan enters into the Taisho and Showa era, this dangerous tradeoff between profits for freedom will accelerate. (See Kasza)



V. The Response and Aftermath to Active State Intervention


The Connection Between Culture and Historical Events

	Numerous domestic and international issues colored statist policies into different color.  The issue of Japanese cultural identity was closely tied together to the efforts of Japan to reverse unequal treaty status and its efforts to modernize.  The successes in the imperialist expansion of Japan fanned the flames of nationalism and stifled the drive for liberty and dissent.  The progression of political trends changed the context of debate regarding the acceptability of certain behaviors and moral convictions.  But had it not been for the Meiji government's linking of modern polity, nationalism, and morality to one another, these events probably would have influenced these issues in a much different light.  Had in not been for the all-inclusive policy of the government to explain all of the functions and identity of the modern Japanese within the frame work of the national polity and culture, not everything about the changes or descriptions of the elements of the individual would be tied to the question of national morality.  It was impossible to talk about the individual identity without justifying in the context of the national makeup.  No part of person's life could be considered to be outside the realm of national morals.  This is probably the single most factor that allowed historical events to influence individual morality as directly as it did in the Meiji era.


The Establishment and Reinforcement of Tradition of Elite Control over the Population

	It could be argued that the only thing that the Meiji authorities had to do was to keep the psychological gap between the kan and the min alive and well.  They maintained it, remodeled it, and reinforced it. (Gluck 60-67)  The Meiji government was very successful in legitimizing the relationship between the bureaucracy and the masses.  It felt so natural.  There seemed to little need to question it.  It was an assumed relationship within the Japanese political thought until very recently.  The Meiji leaders with the cooperation of the elite and the bureaucracy had succeeded in creating a resilient hegemony.
	Jay Rubin, in addresses the 1887 regulation over newspaper, states that "All through the text [of the regulation] maintained a facade of establishing no prior restraint upon the printed word, the practical impact of the law was to encourage the traditional self-policing of the publishing industry." (Rubin 15)  Bar in mind that the standards of obscenity have relaxed considerably since the days of the Meiji's censors, but the basic position of the publishers in Japan today remain the same.  While further studies await to be conducted, it can be argued that the basic relationship between the censor (bureaucracy) and the censored (publishers) have not changed. (Soejima 77-78)  This is another example where the legacy of the Meiji era lives on.



Time line of Censorship
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1868	Meiji Restoration
1868/4	Dajohkan Decree #358: The need for press regulations
1868/5	Meiji forces capture Edo castle
1869/4	Shu'pan Jyorei: First Meiji press regulations
1871/7	Ministry of Education established, obtains the right to censor
1873	Rokumeisha enstablished.
	Home Minstry established
	Governement forbids the publication of material that might contribute the instability of the people (in aticipation of the Seinan no Ran)
1875/6	Newspaper Ordinance: Authority to censor changed from the Ministry of Education to the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry.  Sever restriction on newspapers are breifly conducted.
1875/9	Publication Ordinace decreed.  This was the first time that harmful to public pease and injurious to morals came into being.
1876/7	Reinforced newspaper ordinance, prohibition of material deemed to be disruptive to national peace.
1877	Seinan no Ran
1879	Juyuu Minken movement errupts
	Freedom of Expression debate errupts
1882	Shintaishi established
	Criminal Code decreed.  Code 175 included?
1887/12	Newspaper Regularion (Shinbun Jyourei) and Publication Regulation (Shu'pan Jyourei) enacted.  The authority to censor mass media is widened to include the Foreign Ministry, Navy, and Army.
1889	The constitution is issued.
1890	Imperial rescript on Education issued.
1893	Assembly Law, Publishing Law enacted by Diet.
1894	Sino-Japan War
1895	Shimonoseki Treaty concludes the Sino Japanese War.
1895	Tripaterate Intervention by France, Russia, and Germany.
1899	Unequal treaty slowly discontinued.
1900	Public Peace Police Law targets opposition political factions and regulates political activism.
1902	Anglo-Japanese Navel Treaty.
1904	Russo-Japanese War errupts.
	Naturalism becomes prominate as a literary movement.
	Koutou Keisatsu (Higher Police) unit created specifically to counter the leftest radical fringe organizations.
1905	Portsmouth Treaty ends the Russo-Japanese War.
1907	Naturalism (Shizen Shugi) comes into force.
1908/2	Ikuta Kizan's "The City" goes to trial.
1909	Diet passes Newspaper Law, Katsura Cabinet and Seiyukai supports the law
1910	"High Treason Incident" ("Taigyaku Jiken"): Koutoku Shusui and the anarchist bombing plot unveiled by police.
1911	Tokubetsu Koutou Keisatsu (Special Higher Police) established. The To'kou was the vanguard of government manipulation of public opinion, the "thought police", the specialists at suppressing dangerious foreign anti-system, anti-state ideology.
1912	Meiji Emporer dies.  Nogi follows.  Taisho era begins.
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1945/8	WW2 ends
1946	Reverse cource in US occupation policy
1952	US occupation of Japan ends.
1991/2/23	Black February (comic book censorship)

Bibliography ver1.0
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